Aristotle’s Quintessential Citizen

In comparison to many other philosophers of classical political thought, Aristotle, in the Politics, takes a somewhat unorthodox approach to understanding and explaining the city. Instead of preliminarily discussing the city as a whole and the characteristics of the polis, his method is to look first at the parts that make up the city: the citizens.

It is clear that the first thing that must be sought is the citizen; for the
city is a certain multitude of citizens. Thus who ought to be called a citizen
and what the citizen is must be investigated (1247b40).

This, in particular, serves as an excellent comparison to Plato’s examination of the city in the Republic where he first defines the many types of regimes and then the corresponding citizen.

For Aristotle, citizenship has little to do with the modern connotation of the word. Citizenship has nothing to do with legal status – being born in a certain nation or applying for citizenship through legal means is completely irrelevant. The modern legal standard for citizenship would not work for Aristotle because of his belief concerning slaves and their place in society. Because slaves are born in the same cities as free men, there must be another standard for citizenship, because slaves are not citizens. This sense of elitism is a prominent tone throughout the Politics and one that readers will see again.

Citizenship is rather seen as dependent upon participation within the regime. There is much more to citizenship than living in or being born in a particular place, or sharing in economic activity, or being ruled under the same laws. It is a kind of activity. “The citizen in an unqualified sense is defined by no other thing so much as by sharing in decision and office” (1275a22). The phrase “sharing in decision and office” has more meaning than initially meets the eye. Aristotle does not necessarily believe that everyone, at all times, should be holding offices and making decisions concerning the city. Rather, he believes citizens are those who can share in office and decision. For example, a citizen may not be on a jury at this very minute, but he could be called; he may not be voting right now, but he could, at a specific time; he may not be serving as a legislator, but he could run. Meaningful participation is what defines citizenship.

Whoever is entitled to participate in an office involving deliberation or
decision is, we can now say, a citizen in this city; and the city is the
multitude of such persons that is adequate with a view to a self-sufficient
life, to speak simply (1275b17).

Direct participation occurs when citizens are sharing in decision and in office. Citizens do not solely vote for representatives but rather they themselves serve as representatives. In addition, citizens should willingly serve on juries and strive to constantly uphold the law. Again, we can draw contrast from “citizens” in modern Western nation-states where there are relatively few opportunities for direct participation and where most passionately struggle to avoid serving on juries.

Aristotle poses the question, “whether the virtue of the good man and the excellent citizen is to be regarded as the same or as not the same” (1276b15). Is being a citizen and a good man enough justification to be classified as a good citizen? Aristotle does not believe so. He postulates that there is a significant difference between what a citizen is and what makes a good citizen, because the citizen will differ in every regime. According to Aristotle, there are six separate and distinct types of regimes, and thus six different kinds of good citizen. “Since there are several regimes, there must necessarily be several kinds of citizen” (1278a15).

While it may seem paradoxical, Aristotle believes that for all citizens, no matter what regime, there is only one common task: the preservation of political life. But the means of achieving this ultimate end varies depending upon regime type.

Although citizens are dissimilar, preservation of the partnership is their task,
and the regime is [this] partnership; hence the virtue of the citizen must
necessarily be with a view to the regime” (1276b27).

Aristotle tells us that if the city is going to endure, it must educate all the citizens in such a way that they support the kind of regime and its legitimizing principles in which they participate. In short, good citizens must have the type of virtue that preserves the partnership and the regime.
Consequently, the best rulers would be the best citizens, because they have the virtue needed to guide the city. Aristotle contends that the good man and the good citizen perfectly coincide when the good citizen is ruling. “If the virtue of the good ruler and the good man is the same, and if one who is ruled is also a citizen, the virtue of citizen and man would not be the same unqualifiedly, but only in the case of a certain sort of citizen” (1277a20). The “case of a certain citizen” refers to Aristotle’s premise of the excellent citizen being subjected to the regime. The best citizens would make the best rulers in their respective regimes because their virtues perfectly align.

Direct participation in political life is necessary for citizens of all regimes who wish to attain Aristotle’s notion of the “good life.” How six very different citizens in very different regimes can actively participate in political life and achieve the same “good life” and “happiness” is another question. There really is no “quintessential citizen” who best achieves the “good life” for Aristotle, but rather six different kinds of good citizens who are each equally excellent.